linux-mips
[Top] [All Lists]

Re: [PATCH 3/5] v2 seccomp_filters: Enable ftrace-based system call filt

To: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/5] v2 seccomp_filters: Enable ftrace-based system call filtering
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Date: Fri, 13 May 2011 17:23:01 +0200
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>, Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>, kees.cook@canonical.com, agl@chromium.org, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>, Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>, Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu>, Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>, Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>, Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>, Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>, Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>, linux390@de.ibm.com, Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>, "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, x86@kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mips@linux-mips.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-sh@vger.kernel.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
In-reply-to: <1305299455.2076.26.camel@localhost.localdomain>
Original-recipient: rfc822;linux-mips@linux-mips.org
References: <1304017638.18763.205.camel@gandalf.stny.rr.com> <1305169376-2363-1-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org> <20110512074850.GA9937@elte.hu> <alpine.LRH.2.00.1105122133500.31507@tundra.namei.org> <20110512130104.GA2912@elte.hu> <alpine.LRH.2.00.1105131018040.3047@tundra.namei.org> <20110513121034.GG21022@elte.hu> <1305299455.2076.26.camel@localhost.localdomain>
Sender: linux-mips-bounce@linux-mips.org
On Fri, 2011-05-13 at 11:10 -0400, Eric Paris wrote:
> Then again, I certainly don't see a
> reason that this syscall hardening patch should be held up while a whole
> new concept in computer security is contemplated... 

Which makes me wonder why this syscall hardening stuff is done outside
of LSM? Why isn't is part of the LSM so that say SELinux can have a
syscall bitmask per security context?

Making it part of the LSM also avoids having to add this prctl().



<Prev in Thread] Current Thread [Next in Thread>